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This paper develops a stylized model to provide a rational explanation 
for  the  boom-and-bust  price  movement  pattern  that  we  frequently 
observe in the real world. Our stylized model indicates that there are 
three conditions to form a boom-and-bust price pattern in a community: 
a move-in of high income residents, wide income gap between new 
and existing residents, and supply process that leads to an inventory 
buildup.  It seems that, based on these three conditions, China is more 
likely to experience a boom-and-bust price movement pattern than a 
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1.  Introduction  
 
The boom-and-bust price movement pattern in the housing market has been 
observed in many countries during the past six decades. The magnitudes of 
the price movements (from boom to bust) in some countries seem too large to 
be justified by rational explanations. In some areas, the prices can double in 
one year and/or drop more than half in a short period of time (for example, 
Hong Kong in 1997 and Las Vegas in 2011). More importantly, the boom-and-
bust price movement pattern is a recurring phenomenon. Since the pains of 
having a boom-and-bust cycle can be deep and widespread, it is difficult to 
understand why people do not learn from past lessons. In other words, if a 
boom-and-bust price pattern is due to the mistakes of market participants, then 
through a learning process, we should expect the magnitude of a cycle to be 
decreasing over time. However, this is not what we have observed in the real 
world. 
    
Many researchers have tried to understand the reason for cycles and the main 
driving  factors  of  these  cycles.  More  importantly,  why  do  boom-and-bust 
price patterns occur only in certain cities during a certain time period? Despite 
the research efforts, it might be fair to say that we still have conflicting views 
about cycles and do not know the causes of the extraordinary rise and decline 
in house prices in certain areas. The lack of theoretical explanations on cycles 
could be attributed to the fact that, while we know the general meaning of a 
boom-and-bust price movement, we do not empirically know the formation 
and bust of a cycle. Since we cannot clearly define a cycle empirically, it 
might  be  difficult  to  explore  the  reasons  for  its  formation.  The  lack  of 
empirical studies on the boom-and-bust price pattern might be due, at least 
partially, to the lack of high quality publicly available information on housing 
prices and economic fundamentals of an area. 
    
Case and Shiller (1988, 1989) are the first to explore the serial correlations in 
housing prices by using a large dataset of transaction prices in the U.S.A. 
They report that housing appreciation rates are positively serially correlated. 
Other  scholars  follow  this  line  of  research  by  using  more  sophisticated 
statistical methods or including economic fundamentals in the estimation of a 
cycle. The research performed by Abraham and Hendershott (1996), Malpezzi 
(1999),  Meen  (2002),  Capozza  et  al.  (2004),  Himmelberg  et  al.  (2005), 
Wheaton, (2005), Wheaton and Nechayev (2008), Lai and Order (2010), and 
Glaeser et al. (2010) are representative works in this direction. However, it 
might  be  safe  to  conclude  that  those  studies,  while  enhancing  our 
understanding about cycles, still fail to give us a clear idea on how cycles are 
formed (or busted). 
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Recent  studies  by  Piazzesi  and  Schneider  (2009),  Ferreira  and  Gyourko 
(2011) and Titman et al. (2011) have begun to provide some clues on the 
formation of cycles. Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) argue that a small fraction 
of optimistic households can make a large impact on the price movement in a 
community.  Ferreira and Gyourko (2011) examine a large dataset and present 
several observations about cycles. First, they report that the magnitude of the 
initial price jump at the start of a boom is significant. Furthermore, they report 
that local income is the only demand shifter that also has a significant change 
around the start of a local housing boom. Finally, the observation that income 
growth rate jumps together with house price appreciation rate applies only to 
areas  with  inelastic  housing  supply.  Titman  et  al.  (2011)  have  similar 
observations.  They  find  that  the  demand  momentum  drives  the  price 
momentum observed in the housing market and the supply rigidity determines 
if the price momentum will last or reverse. Indeed, while supply rigidity in the 
initial stage will fuel a price increase in the market, a significant price drop 
can only occur if there is a significant inventory buildup during the price run-
up period. The evidence from these three papers seems to collectively reveal 
three observations. First, a housing boom is originated by an initial jump in 
the  demand  by  a  fraction  of  the  residents  in  a  community.  Second,  the 
transactions  made  by  a  fraction  of  the  residents  are  sufficient  to  make  a 
significant price impact to the area. Third and finally, supply elasticity seems 
to play an important role, although the details of its impacts are still not totally 
clear. 
 
Since future demand is difficult to estimate and construction takes time, the 
supply decision of developers is made under uncertainty. Because the total 
supply is determined by the construction decisions of all developers in the 
market, the construction decision of one developer will affect the construction 
decisions of other developers. The literature on real options provides some 
useful  guidance  on  how  developers  make  a  construction  decision  under 
uncertainty  and  in  an  oligopoly  market  (see,  for  example,  Titman  (1985), 
Williams (1993), Grenadier (1996), Wang and Zhou (2000, 2006) and Lai et 
al. (2007) for a discussion of issues related to real options). In recent years, 
Blackley  (1999),  Mayer  and  Somerville  (2000),  Jud  and  Winkler  (2002), 
Harter-Dreiman (2004), Green et al. (2005), Glaeser et al. (2006), Saiz (2010), 
and  Wang  et  al.  (2012)  have  provided  some  empirical  evidence  on  the 
determinants of the supply decisions of developers. While the evidence on this 
issue  is  still  thin,  it  might  be  safe  to  conclude  that  the  magnitude  of  the 
uncertainty affects housing starts and that a significant supply responsiveness 
to price (that is, the sensitivity of supply change to a price change in the 
market) is documented at least in some city-level data. 
 
Motivated by the recent empirical evidence on boom-and-bust price patterns, 
this  paper  develops  a  stylized  model  to  provide  a  rational  explanation  of 
cycles. Our model starts with a stable community. If a small portion of high 
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community. If a developer continues to build up the inventory, then price will 
fall once the low income residents start to move out of the community and 
create  more  vacant  units.  Our  next  section  will  provide  a  conceptual 
framework of our model. Section Three discusses the model dynamics and 
gives a realistic scenario for a boom-and-bust price movement pattern. Section 




2.  Model Framework   
 
Our  model  critically  depends  on  the  concepts  in  which  observed  property 
prices are determined by marginal trades and that not all properties in a given 
market are simultaneously available for trade. Consequently, we can clearly 
distinguish between two prices: transaction price 𝑃 and implicit price V. In 
our definitions, while both prices are determined by the supply and demand 
conditions in a community, there is a difference on what constitutes the supply 
and demand in each case. In our definition, an implicit price in a community 
is determined by the number of units and the income level of all residents in 
the  community,  by  assuming  that  all  residents  (new  or  existing)  in  the 
community can buy and sell their properties at any given time. In other words, 
this is the price that residents (with a given level of income) are willing to pay 
for properties in a particular neighborhood.  However, since it is likely that 
not all residents will tender their homes at any given time period (due to jobs, 
family  ties,  and  moving  costs),  we  can  only  infer  this  implicit  price,  but 
cannot directly observe it from market activities. 
    
On the other hand, the transaction price is determined by  marginal trades, 
which is based on the available supply (new units supplied by developers plus 
vacant units created by residents who have moved out of the community) and 
active  buyers  in  the  market  (new  residents  who  have  just  moved  into  the 
community) at a given period. In other words, the transaction price definition 
recognizes that not all properties will be available in the market for sale and 
not  all  existing  residents  will  simultaneously  sell  their  homes.  In  reality, 
transactions  prices  are  the  prices  that  we  can  directly  observe  from  the 
marketplace and are often used to measure the property price movement in a 
community. 
   
Given these two definitions, it is clear that the transaction price (which we can 
observe) could differ from the implicit price (which we cannot observe). In a 
stable  community  where  the  income  level  of  residents  who  move  into  a 
community is the same as that of existing residents, and where the numbers of 
residents who move into (and out of) the community can be estimated with 
reasonable accuracy, the implicit price and the transaction price should be 
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level of income (or can pay more for housing consumption) than the existing 
residents,  then  the  transaction  price  (determined  by  the  new  high  income 
residents) we observe will be higher than the implicit price. The boom-and-
bust pattern that we frequently observe in real estate markets can be explained 
by examining the movements of these two prices. In the next sub-section, we 
will clearly define the implicit price and the transaction price in relation to the 
real income 𝐼, number of residents who move out of a community, ?, number 
of  residents  who  move  into  a  community,  ? ,  and  new  supply  from 
developers, ?. We will then discuss the strategies of each player (residents 
who  move  in,  residents  who  move  out,  and  developers)  in  the  three 
subsequent sub-sections to complete the model framework. 
 
2.1  Transaction and Implicit Prices 
 
To  begin  the  analysis,  we  assume  that  at  the  initial  period,  there  are  two 
identical communities. Both communities have ?0 residents and ?0 units of 
identical houses (which are occupied by the ?0 residents). In other words, at 
period  0,  we  assume  that  demand  equals  supply  and  the  market  is  in 
equilibrium.    The ?0 residents  have  an  identical  real  income  level 𝐼0.    (It 
should be noted that, while it is true that only a fixed percentage of the income 
of residents can be spent on housing consumption, to simplify our notations, 
we use 𝐼₀ as the income level that residents are willing to spend on housing 
consumption.)  Consequently, a higher resident income level means a higher 
price in the community. We define, at the initial stage, the implicit price of a 
housing  unit  in  a  community  as  the  total  available  income  ?0𝐼0  in  a 
community  divided  by  the  number  of  units  ?0  available  in  the  same 
community.  This  implicit  price  can  also  be  interpreted  as  the  price  that  a 
resident  has  to  pay  for  a  property  in  other  communities  with  identical 
characteristics  as  this  community.  Given  this  specification,  at  time  0,  the 
implicit price 𝑉0 in the community is 
                                     𝑉0 =
?0𝐼0
?0
.                                                     (1) 
Assume that in period 1, the developers will supply ?1 housing units to the 
community. During the period, there will also be ?1 new residents (with a 
real  income  level 𝐼1)  who  will  move  into  this  community  and ?1 existing 
residents (with a real income level 𝐼0) who will move out of the community.  
Under this circumstance, the implicit price in the community at the end of 
period 1 is defined as 
                                             𝑉 1 =
(?0−?1)𝐼0+?1𝐼1
?0+?1
.                                         (2) 
𝑉 1 represents the price that the residents are willing to pay if all the properties 
are available for sale during the period and is based on the total real income 
((?0 − ?1)𝐼0 + ?1𝐼1) and the total inventory (?0 + ?1) in the community.   Chan, Wang and Yang    262 
 
    
Similarly, we assume that there will also be ?2 new residents (with a real 
income level 𝐼2) who will move into the community and ?2 existing residents 
who will move out of the community in period 2.  In addition, the developers 
will supply ?2 housing units to the community. To simplify the notations, 
we assume that all the ?2 residents who move out of the community are with a 
real  income  level 𝐼0.  Given  this  assumption,  the  implicit  price 𝑉2 in  the 
community in period 2 is 
                                   𝑉2 =
(?0−?1−?2)𝐼0+?1𝐼1+?2𝐼2
?0+?1+?2
 .                              (3) 
On the other hand, we assume that at the end of each period, the transaction 
price is determined by the number of residents (with a real income level 𝐼) 
who move into the community and the number of properties on the market 
(the new supply ? and number of residents who move out ?) at the end of the 
period. It should be noted that because of moving costs, not all of the residents 
will put their properties on the market even if the prices are attractive. Given 
this, the transaction prices in periods 0, 1 and 2 can be specified as 
                                               𝑃0 =
?0𝐼0
?0







𝐼1                                       (5) 
and 






𝐼2,                 (6) 
respectively.  
 
The price level in a community in period 1 is determined by the income level 
of the newcomer ?1𝐼1 and the available units (?1 + ?1) in the market. Clearly, 
when supply equals demand (
?1
?1+?1
= 1), Equations (2) and (5) indicate that 
𝑃11 is  greater  than  (or  equal  to)  𝑉 1 if 𝐼1 is  greater  than  (or  equal  to) 𝐼0 
(similar  arguments  also  apply  to  Equations  (3)  and  (6)).  Under  this 
circumstance, the change in prices is only influenced by the change in income 
levels of residents in the community. However, when  
?1
?1+?1
≠ 1, in addition to 
the  income  effect,  the  excess  supply  (or  demand)  will  put  an  additional 
downward (or upward) pressure on the price level in the community. Given 
this, the next three sub-sections will discuss the determinants of the number of 
residents who will move into a community, ?, the number of residents who 
will move out of a community, ?, and the new supply ?. 
 
2.2  Move-in Decision of Newcomers  
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exogenously determined. Newcomers will have to sell their existing homes 
and find a new home in the new community. Since such moves take time, we 
assume that these individuals will have to make a decision to move at the 
beginning of a period in order to move into another community at the end of 
the  period.  Once  the  moving  decision  is  made,  they  cannot  change  their 
decisions and will have to move regardless, since they will have to sell their 
current homes. 
 
At  the  time  (period)  when  individuals  make  a  decision  to  move  into  a 
community, they know the inventory of homes in the last period, vacancy 
level, transaction price, and implicit price in the community (for example, in 
period 1, they know all the information in period 0). They also have general 
knowledge  about  the  estimated  new  supply  from  developers  for  the  next 
period, and the estimated number of residents who will move into or out of the 
community.  The  information  is  available  for  the  newcomers  to  make  a 
decision on the price that they will pay.  This also implies that, while in period 
0 they can have an estimate of the transaction price and the implicit price at 
the end of period 1, the realized prices at the end of period 1 could differ from 
their estimates. Given this, the decision of new residents to move into a new 
community will not be affected by the realized price at the end of the period. 
Consequently, the number of residents who will move into a community is an 
exogenous variable in this stylized model. 
 
2.3  Supply Decision of Developers  
 
The objective of a developer is to maximize his/her profits in the next period. 
Developers  will  supply  new  units  to  the  market  as  long  as  they  expect  a 
positive net demand in the next period. In other words, even if they believe 
that the community will eventually be overbuilt in the long run, they will still 
build as long as they can sell their products in the short run. In addition, 
because constructions take time to complete, developers will have to make 
construction  decisions  well  ahead  of  the  realization  of  the  projected  net 
demand. For a single-family housing unit, the actual construction time can be 
more than six months. Given the time to obtain building permits and construct 
required infrastructures (such as roads, water, waste water, and utilities), it is 
fair to say that the average construction time lag will be more than one year. 
As such, developers will have to begin construction at least one year ahead of 
the projected positive demand.  
 
It is also costly for developers to stop a construction process once construction 
starts because all costs are sunk. In other words, because of the construction-
lag problem, in period 0, developers will have to estimate the existing number 
of vacant units and the net demand (the number of the residents who will 
move into the community minus the number of the residents who will move 
out of the community in period 1) before starting the construction process. We  Chan, Wang and Yang    264 
 
assume  that  the  number  of  new  residents  and  vacant  units  are  common 
knowledge to all parties involved. However, the information on the number of 
residents who will move out of the community is difficult to obtain, and as 
such, developers will have to use an estimated number 𝑗̃ to make their supply 
decision.  Since  the  supply  decision  can  be  observed  by  all  players  in  the 
market, the estimation by developers on the number of residents who  will 
move  out  of  the  community, 𝑗̃, should  also  be  common  knowledge  to  all 
players in the market. 
 
When the expected net demand ? − 𝑗̃ is positive and larger than the number of 
vacant units ? in the market, developers will supply new units to the market in 
the amount of  ? = ? − 𝑗̃ − ? > 0. It should be noted that ? could be negative 
(which represents unfilled demand) if developers undersupply the market in 
this period. However, when this happens, developers will supply ? additional 
units to make up for this unfilled demand in the next period.  If, however, 
? − 𝑗̃ < ?, developers will not supply any more units to the market and ? = 0.  
It should be noted that these assumptions are  made to simplify the  model 
presentation. It is possible that a developer will keep on building even if m – 𝑗̃ 
<  u.  One  possible  reason  is  that  the  developer  has  to  utilize  the  existing 
machineries and employees because they are fixed costs. The other reason 
could be that the developer has only a small equity stake in the project. The 
loss in equity can be compensated by the profits from being the contractor of 
the project. Wang and Zhou (2000) also argue that developers may overbuild 
simply to compete for development opportunities. However, overbuilding will 
only  make  the  boom-and-bust  patterns  more  severe,  and  so  we  decide  to 
ignore this possibility to keep the model simple. With this model setup, the 
total inventory in a community at the end of each period can be estimated with 
certainty. If the total number of units in a community at the initial period is 
?0, then at the end of periods 1 and 2, the total number of units available in 
the community will be ?1 = ?0 + ?1 and ?2 = ?0 + ?1 + ?2, respectively. 
 
It should be noted that ?₁ and ?₂ are based on the estimations of ?, 𝑗̃ and ?. 
In our model, while both ? and ? are public information that can be obtained 
without errors, the number of residents who will move out of the community, 
𝑗̃ , in each period is private information that developers can only conjecture 
(and the conjecture is subject to errors).  It is important to know that, in order 
to maximize profits, developers should build as long as there is a demand. 
Given  this,  we  assume  that  developers  will  infer  the  number  of  existing 
residents  who  will  move  out  from  the  community  in  this  period  from  the 
number of residents who moved out of the community in the last period. In 
other words, if the developers in this period observe fewer (more) than the 
number of residents who were expected to move out of the community in the 
last period, they will revise their estimation by decreasing (or increasing) the 
number of residents they expect to move out this period. Consequently, when 
𝑗̃₁ =  ?₀,  ?₁ =  ?₁ − 𝑗̃₁ − ?₀  = ?₁ −  ?₀ − ?₀ and the move-out decisions of 265    Rational Explanation for Boom-and-Bust Price Patterns 
 
the existing residents in this period affect the supply decisions of developers 
in the next period. 
 
More  importantly,  it  should  be  noted  that  in  this  model,  the  move-out 
decisions of existing residents and the supply decisions of developers could 
result in an inventory buildup process. To see this, we assume that there is a 
community with 500 existing residents and 500 housing units. The developers 
expect that there will be 25 new residents moving into this community in each 
of the next 3 periods.  At the beginning of the period, the developers also 
expect that, on average, 10 existing residents will move out of the community 
in each period. Consequently, the developers supply 15 units (25 − 10 = 15) 
to the market in the first period. However, if the developers find out that only 
3 residents moved out of the community in the first period, they will revise 
their  estimate  on  the  number  of  residents  who  will  move  out  from  the 
community in the next period from 10 to 3.  Since there are 7 units of unfilled 
demand from the first period, the developers will supply a total of 29 units 
(25 − 3 + 7  =  29) to the market, assuming that at the end of the second 
period, the developers observe that 3 residents move out of the community. 
With this information, the developers will supply a total of 22 units (25 −
3  =  22) in the third period. However, what will happen if 24, instead of 3, 
existing residents decide to move out of the community in the third period? It 
should  be  noted  that,  in  this  example,  the  total  number  of  residents  who 
moved out of the community during this 3-year period is still 30 (3 + 3 +
24 = 30), as projected by the developers at the beginning of the period. 
 
In this example, the total number of units in the community will be changed 
from the 500 units (at the beginning of the period) to 515 units (500 existing 
units plus the 15 new units) at the end of the first period. The demand in this 
period is 25 units, but there are only 18 units of supply in the market (15 units 
supplied by the developers and 3 units supplied by the residents who moved 
out of the community). This situation will certainly fuel an increase in the 
transaction price in the community.  In the second period, the total number of 
housing units is 544 units (515 existing units plus 29 new units). The demand 
for housing is 32 units (25 new demand plus the 7 units of unfilled demand 
from the first period), and the total number of units in the market is 32 (29 
units  supplied  by  the  developers  and  3  units  supplied  by  the  existing 
residents).  In the third period, the total number of units in the community is 
566 units (544 existing units plus 22 new  units). The demand for housing 
units is 25. However, we now have 46 units of supply in the market (22 units 
supplied by the developers and 24 units supplied by the existing residents). 
This  situation  will  put  tremendous  downward  pressure  on  the  price  in  the 
community. The example shows a possible inventory buildup process during a 
boom-and-bust period (even if the developers have correctly estimated the 
aggregate net demand over the 3-year period).  Given this, it is important to 
understand the strategy of existing residents that underlie their move-out (or  Chan, Wang and Yang    266 
 
stay) decisions, which is the main driver of the inventory buildup that will 
lead to a boom-and-bust price movement pattern. 
 
2.4  Move-out Decision of Existing Residents  
 
In  our  model,  the  number  of  newcomers  to  a  community  is  exogenously 
determined.  The  number  of  units  supplied  to  the  market  (or  the  supply 
decision of developers) is endogenously determined, but not forward looking.  
However,  the  number  of  residents  who  will  move  out  of  a  community  is 
endogenously determined in our model. In addition, their decisions should be 
mainly forward looking, which involve the selection of the best time to move 
out. In our model, it is the number of existing residents who decide to move 
out that drives the boom-and-bust price patterns in a community. 
 
At the beginning of each period, existing residents will decide if they want to 
stay in the community. There are two reasons to move out of a community. 
The first is stochastic and unsystematic, which is related to changes in the 
personal condition of a resident. The second is systematic, which is related to 
the price movement in the community. Similar to a move-in decision, we also 
assume that the decision of a resident to move out has to be made at the 
beginning of the period and cannot be changed once made. (This assumption 
is quite reasonable since it will take time for the resident to look for a new job 
or find a new home in the new community.) When existing residents decide to 
move out, they will tender their houses to the market. 
 
When a resident believes that the transaction price is higher than the implicit 
price in a community, there  is an incentive  for the resident to sell his/her 
property  and  buy  a  comparable  property  in  another  community.  This  will 
happen  when  the  new  residents  moving  into  a  community  have  a  higher 
income than the existing residents. Under this circumstance, the transaction 
price of a property (based on the higher income level of the new residents) in 
the community is higher than the implicit price (partially based on the lower 
income level of the existing residents) that the existing residents are willing to 
pay for the property (as defined in Equations (2) and(5)). In other words, at 
time ?,  whenever 𝑃? − 𝑉? = 𝐺? > 0,  there  is  an  incentive  for  the  existing 
residents to move out of the community. However, this condition (𝑃? − 𝑉? =
𝐺? > 0) alone does not guarantee that they will move out for two reasons.  
First, the residents have ties to the community and there are transaction costs 
to  move  out.  Second,  in  anticipation  of  the  movement  of  future  prices, 
existing residents will develop a bidding strategy to find the optimal time to 
sell. 
 
In other words, the costs to move not only include the explicit moving costs, 
but also the ties of a resident to the community and his/her job.  The resident 
might not be able to find a similar job in another community if s/he decides to 267    Rational Explanation for Boom-and-Bust Price Patterns 
 
arbitrage the difference between the transaction price and the implicit price. 
This resident will also need to start building new relationships and friendships 
in a new community. It might take time for the resident to become familiar 
with the new environment. In our model, we assume that the cost to move out 
varies by individuals and is private information. We define the cost to move 
out  for  the  i-th  existing  resident  at  time ? as 𝑐?,?.  Given  this,  an  existing 
resident will consider to arbitrage the difference between the transaction price 
and  implicit  price  only  if  the  difference  is  large  enough  to  cover  his/her 
moving costs (that is, 𝑃? − 𝑉? − 𝑐?,? = 𝐺? − 𝑐?,? > 0). 
 
However, it should be noted that even if the transaction price is higher than 
the  sum  of  the  implicit  price  and  the  moving  cost  (when 𝐺? − 𝑐?,? > 0), 
existing residents might not automatically sell their properties and move out. 
When anticipating future residents with a higher income to move in, existing 
residents will wait to see if others in the community will sell their properties. 
They realize that, when the new residents have a higher income level than the 
existing residents, the future transaction price should be higher if the current 
residents do not begin to tender their properties. Under this circumstance, it 
might be optimal for an existing resident to wait if s/he believes that other 
existing residents will also wait. This belief (that others will wait) will hold if 
the resident expects that other existing residents have relatively higher moving 
costs. 
 
Since the moving cost of a resident is private information, at the beginning of 
every period, each existing resident  will speculate on  the  moving costs of 
other existing residents to decide whether to tender his/her property and move 
out of the community. We define 𝑐? = (𝑐1,?,…,𝑐?,?) as the moving costs of n 
existing  residents  at  the  beginning  of  period  t,  with  𝑐?,? as  the  private 
information of the i-th existing resident. We further assume that 0 ≤ 𝑐1,? ≤
𝑐2,?,… ≤ 𝑐?,? where 𝑐1,? is the lowest moving cost, and 𝑐2,?  to 𝑐?,? are defined 
as  the  second  lowest  to  the  highest  moving  costs  of  the  residents  in  the 
community. We assume that, while not exactly knowing the moving costs of 
all  residents,  each  resident  can  speculate  on  the  ranking  of  his/her  own 
moving costs relative to that of others in the same community. An existing 
resident will not tender his/her property if s/he does not observe a sufficient 
number of existing residents who tender their properties. In other words, if a 
resident believes that his/her  moving costs should be the 10th lowest  in a 
community, this resident will not tender his/her property until 9 other existing 
residents tender their properties first. 
 
We  also  assume  that,  at  the  beginning  of  every  period,  each  resident  has 
his/her  own  estimate  of  the  moving  cost  structure 𝑐? ̃ = (𝑐1,? ̃ ,…,𝑐?,? ̃ ).  The 
moving cost information of existing residents will be gradually released to the 
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observing the number of residents who have moved out of the community, 
each existing resident can update his/her information on the moving costs of 
the remaining residents. If the number of existing residents who have moved 
out  of  the  community  turns  out  to  be  lower  (higher)  than  expected,  the 
remaining  residents  will  interpret  that  other  existing  residents  should  have 
moving costs that are higher (lower) than what they had originally estimated. 
Thus, the move-out exercise of any existing resident will affect the remaining 
residents’ moving cost estimates of others. This, in turn, will affect the moving 
decisions of the remaining residents in the next period. 
     
However,  it  is  also  reasonable  to  assume  that  existing  residents  will  wait 
indefinitely  when  they  can  earn  an  arbitrage  profit  (when 𝑃? − 𝑉? − 𝑐?,? =
𝐺? − 𝑐?,? > 0) by tendering their properties to the market. While it might be 
optimal for an existing resident to wait if other residents are also waiting, we 
assume that each existing resident also has a maximum reservation profit 𝑅?,?. 
Whenever  the  arbitrage  profit  𝐺? − 𝑐?,?  is  greater  than  the  maximum 
reservation profit of a resident, 𝑅?,?, this resident will stop waiting and tender 
his/her property in the next period. 
 
It should be noted that the moving costs of an existing resident can also be 
affected by the moving decisions of other residents. In other words, moving 
costs decline as residents with similar backgrounds begin to move out of the 
community.  This  can  be  justified  by  the  fact  that  when  a  similar  type  of 
resident leaves a community, those who stay behind may enjoy lower tangible 
or intangible benefits. For example, when higher income residents begin to 
move in and lower income residents begin to move out, the property tax in the 
community might become too high for the existing residents. (This is part of 
the reason why California has the Property 13 legislation to protect existing 
residents  from a property tax increase due to the  move-in of  high income 
residents.) In addition, the social-cultural aspects of lifestyle in the community 
might dramatically change or traffic congestion might become too severe for 
some  to  endure.  More  importantly,  the  community  might  become  too 
expensive for the lower income residents to live in. Thus, as more existing 
residents move out of the community, the moving costs of those who remain 
will  be  reduced.  We  assume  that  this  effect  on  the  moving  costs  of  the 
remaining residents is equal and known to all existing residents. We use a 
coefficient 𝜃(?) to represent this effect, where ? represents residents who have 
already moved out. We set 𝜃(0) = 1 and 𝜃(?) is a decreasing function of ?. 
Under this specification, when all the existing residents stay in the game, we 
have the moving cost structure (𝑐1,?,…,𝑐?,?)  just as before. After the resident 
with  the  lowest  moving  cost 𝑐1,? moves  out,  the  remaining ? − 1 existing 
residents have a moving cost structure 
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The distribution of the remaining ? − 1 moving costs of existing residents is 
updated period by period. Similarly, after ? existing residents have moved out, 
the remaining ? − ? residents have a moving cost structure 
 
                  (𝜃(? )𝑐?+1,?,…,𝜃(? )𝑐?,?) = 𝜃(? )(𝑐?+1,?,…,𝑐?,?)                    (8) 
 
It should be noted that the lower the moving cost, the easier it is  for the 
existing residents to move out of the community. 
 
To sum up, in the initial period, when the transaction price in a community 
begins  to  increase,  existing  residents  might  not  want  to  move  out  of  the 
community (and arbitrage the price difference) because they believe that other 
residents might have higher moving costs. In later periods, however, if the 
remaining residents observe that more residents than expected are moving out 
of the community, they might revise their belief and will also move out of the 
community. The move-out of existing residents will happen sooner or later for 
two reasons. First, existing residents will move out whenever the difference in 
the transaction prices is higher than their maximum reservation profit. This 
means that the higher the transaction price, the higher the likelihood that more 
existing residents will tender their properties. Second, the moving costs of 
existing  residents  decrease  as  the  number  of  new  residents  (with  higher 
income) moving into a community increases. This means that it is more likely 
for an existing resident to move out of a community as the number of new 
residents in the community increases. Given this, the move-out decision of 
existing residents is endogenously determined in the model and the move-out 
will happen whenever the transaction price is high enough and/or there are 
enough new residents in the community. It should be noted that the moving 
(or  staying)  decision  of  existing  residents  will  affect  the  supply  level  of 
properties  in  a  community  and  hence,  the  transaction  price  level  in  the 
community. In our model, this decision is the main factor that causes a boom-
and-bust price pattern in a community. 
 
 
3.  The Dynamics 
 
Within this conceptual framework, we are able to explain the boom-and-bust 
price movement pattern that we frequently observe in the real world. In our 
framework, the price level is determined by the type of residents (high or low 
income) who will move into a community, and by the timing of the move-out 
decisions of the existing residents through their effect on the supply level in 
the community. Depending on the parameter values of these two variables, we 
should be able to come up with different patterns of price movement. In this 
paper, we will only concentrate on one realistic scenario that will result in a 
boom-and-bust pattern. To explain the boom-and-bust pattern, we will use a 
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periods.  We  will  accomplish  this  by  first  establishing  the  conditions  for  a 
stable price movement pattern, and then describing how prices can deviate 
from  the  stable  state  to  form  a  boom-and-bust  pattern.  We  term  the 
community with a stable price pattern and the community with a boom-and-
bust price pattern as Community A and Community B, respectively. 
 
3.1  A Stable Community  
 
We  start  the  analyses  by  discussing  the  conditions  for  a  community  to 
maintain  a  stable  price  movement.  We  define  a  price  movement  as  stable 
when  the  price  change  is  identical  to  the  change  in  real  income.  From 
Equations  (1)to  (3),  we  know  that  the  implicit  price  in  a  community  is 
determined by the real income level of all the residents and the total supply 
level  in  the  community.  From  Equations  (4)  to  (6),  we  know  that  the 
transaction price in a community is determined by the real income level of the 
new  residents  and  the  net  supply  level  in  the  community.  For  this  stable 
community, we assume that the real income level of the new and existing 
residents during three consecutive periods are the same, or  𝐼0 = 𝐼1 = 𝐼2 = 𝐼. 
Note that ?₀ is the number of existing residents. From Equations (1) and (4), 
the implicit price 𝑉?0 and the transaction price 𝑃?0 in Community A at period 0 
are 
                          𝑉?0 =
?0𝐼0
?0
= 𝐼0 = 𝐼                                      (9) 
and 
                                  𝑃?0 =
?0𝐼0
?0
= 𝐼0 = 𝐼,                                    (10) 
respectively. 
     
When the real income levels do not change (𝐼0 = 𝐼1 = 𝐼), and the supply level 
of the next period ?1 is the same as the net demand (the difference between 
the number of residents who move into and move out of the community), or 
?1 − ?1, then from Equations (2) and (5), we know that the implicit price 𝑉?1 
and the transaction price 𝑃?1 in the stable community at the end of period 1 
are 
                       𝑉?1 =
(?0−?1)𝐼0+?1𝐼1
?0+?1
= 𝐼                                (11) 
and 
                               𝑃?1 =
?1𝐼1
?1+?1
= 𝐼1 = 𝐼,                                    (12) 
 
respectively.  Similarly,  with  the  same  conditions  that 𝐼0 = 𝐼1 = 𝐼2 = 𝐼 and  
?2 = ?2 − ?2, then from Equations (3) and (6), we know that the implicit 
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period 2 are 
                                𝑉?2 =
(?0−?1−?2)𝐼0+?1𝐼1+?2𝐼2
?0+?1+?2
= 𝐼                         (13) 
and 
            𝑃?2 =
?2𝐼2
(?1+?1−?1)+?2+?2
 = 𝐼2 = 𝐼,                         (14) 
respectively. 
 
It is clear that, under the assumption of a stable real income and when supply 
equals  demand,  the  implicit  price  in  a  community  is  always  equal  to  the 
transaction price in the community. Under this circumstance, residents of a 
community will move in and out only based on personal reasons, which are 
stochastic. More importantly, under this circumstance, the moving decisions 
of residents do not affect the movement of the price level. 
 
3.2  A Boom-and-Bust Community  
 
We now analyze the boom-and-bust price movement pattern in Community B. 
For  this  community,  we  assume  that  the  real  income  levels  of  new  and 
existing  residents  during  the  three  periods  are  different.  Specifically,  we 
assume that 𝐼0 < 𝐼1 > 𝐼2 . In other words, the new residents who move into 
the community in period 1 have a higher income than the existing residents. 
However,  this  trend  is  reversed  in  period 2,  where  the  newcomers  have  a 
lower real income than the newcomers of period 1. From Equations (1) and 
(4), the implicit price and the transaction price in Community B at time 0, 𝑉𝑏0 
and 𝑃𝑏0, respectively, are 
                           𝑉𝑏0 =
?0𝐼0
?0
= 𝐼0                                                (15) 
and 
                           𝑃𝑏0 =
?0𝐼0
?0
= 𝐼0.                                                (16) 
 
At this stage, the residents of Communities A and B are both willing to pay 
the same transaction price (which is the same as the implicit price) for the 
same type of community. The residents of these two communities, therefore, 
can move freely from one community to the other. We assume that, in period 
1, the real income level of the new residents who move into Community B 
increases at a rate of 𝑔1 (or 𝐼0(1 + 𝑔1) = 𝐼1). From Equations (2) and (5), we 
know that the implicit price 𝑉𝑏1 and the transaction price 𝑃𝑏1 in Community B 
at the end of period 1 are 
 









𝐼0                (17) 
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and 






)𝐼1,                                (19) 
respectively. 
 
Equations (17) and (19) clearly indicate that there are two effects that cause 
the difference in the implicit price and the transaction price in a community: 
the real income effect and the supply effect. To see the real income effect, we 







= 1, the 𝑃𝑏1 reported in Equation (19) 
is clearly larger than the 𝑉𝑏1 reported in Equation (18). This means that, in 
Community B, the transaction price will be higher than the concurrent implicit 
price. It is also clear that the implicit price in Community B, 𝑉𝑏1, (reported in 
Equation (17)), is higher than the concurrent implicit price in Community A, 
𝑉?1, (reported in Equation (11)). This means that the new residents (with a 
higher income)  in Community B  will push  up the transaction price in the 
community to a level that is higher than the concurrent implicit price that an 
average resident of Community B is  willing to pay. Furthermore, with the 
higher income group, the implicit price in Community B (the price that an 
average resident in Community B is willing to pay) is also higher than the 
concurrent implicit price in Community A (the price that an average resident 
in Community A is willing to pay). Additionally, because of new residents 
moving into Community B, Equations (7) and (8) indicate that the ties of the 
existing  residents  to  the  community  will  be  reduced.  In  fact,  since  the 
environment  in  Community  B  is  changed  by  the  new  residents,  the  lower 
income  group  (existing  residents)  in  this  community  will  find  their  own 
lifestyles to be more in line with that of Community A (the stable community) 
than  with the new  lifestyle in their own community.  This  means that the 
move-in of new residents reduces the moving costs of the existing residents. 
 
Under this circumstance, the existing residents in Community B will have an 
incentive  to  sell  their  homes  at  the  higher  transaction  price  and  move  to 
Community A, where the environment could be more suitable for them and 
the transaction price is lower. By doing so, these residents can obtain not only 
a similar or better lifestyle, but also profit from the difference between the 
transactions prices in these two communities. However, some of the existing 
residents might not want to move out yet because of moving costs and their 
expectation that the price might continue to go up.  It is clear that, as long as 
this  group of existing residents  holds on to their properties, the difference 
between the transaction price and implicit price will widen if the real income 
level of the new residents keeps on increasing. 
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The income effect can be amplified by the supply effect. For example, if the 
supply level of the next period k₁ is less than the net demand ?1 − ?1 (or  
?1 ≤ ?1 − ?1), then 
?1
?1+?1
> 1 and  
(?0+?1−?1)
?0+?1
> 1. When ?1 + ?1 and ?1 are 






> 1.    From 
Equations (18) and (19), we know that the gap between the transaction price 
𝑃𝑏1 and the implicit price 𝑉𝑏1 in Community B will be even larger under this 
condition. In other  words, the supply effect (?1 ≤ ?1 − ?1) should  have a 
greater  impact  on  the  transaction  price  than  on  the  implicit  price  in  the 
community. That is, the supply factor will further push the transaction price 
upward (relative to the implicit price). 
 
To sum up, the transaction price in a community can be pushed up by the 
move-in of new residents with a higher real income level. While the higher 
transaction price gives the existing residents an incentive to move out, some 
of the existing residents might decide to stay put because they anticipate that 
the transaction price will continue to increase if other existing residents also 
remain in the community. In the first period, the developers anticipate that 
some existing residents might move out of the community and do not supply 
enough units to the community. Since those residents did not move out at the 
end, the shortage in supply further pushes up the transaction price to a level 
that  cannot  be  justified  by  the  real  income  level  alone.  If  richer  residents 
continuously  move  into  the  community,  then  the  transaction  price  in  the 
community will be increased at a rate faster than the income growth rate of 
the community. This is when we see the boom period of the cycle.  However, 
this  boom  period  could  also  be  the  period  for  developers  to  build  up  the 
inventory. When developers realize that existing residents did not move out of 
the  community  during  the  boom  period,  they  will  begin  to  anticipate  that 
fewer  residents  will  move  out  of  the  community  in  the  future,  and 
consequently will begin to supply more units to accommodate the expected 
number of new residents (while ignoring the possibility that many existing 
residents could move out). When this happens, one will expect to see a huge 
vacancy once the boom period ends and existing residents begin to move out. 
 
We now begin to discuss the bust period (or period 2). We assume that in 
period 2, the real income level of the new residents decreases (rather than 
increases) at a rate of 𝑔2 (or 𝐼1(1 − 𝑔2) = 𝐼2). From Equations (3) and (6), we 
know that the implicit price 𝑉𝑏2 and the transaction price 𝑃𝑏2 in the boom-
and-bust community (Community B) at the end of period 2 are 
                        𝑉𝑏2 =
(?0−?1−?2)𝐼0+?1𝐼1+?2𝐼2
?0+?1+?2
                                  (20) 
and 
                                𝑃𝑏2 =
?2𝐼2
(?1+?1−?1)+?2+?2
 ,                                         (21) 
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respectively.  To  simplify  the  presentation,  we  let ?1 = ?1 − ?1 (and ?1 =
?0 + ?1 = ?0 + ?1 − ?1) and define 𝐼0−1 as a weighted average real income 
of all existing residents (with real income 𝐼0 or 𝐼1) at the end of period 2. With 
this simplification, Equations (20) and (21) can be re-written as 
                                  𝑉𝑏2 =
(?1−?2)𝐼0−1+?2𝐼2
?1+?2
                                      (22) 
and 
                                 𝑃𝑏2 =
?2𝐼2
?2+?2
,                                                       (23) 
 
respectively.  Note that Equations (22) and (23) resemble Equations (17) and 
(19).  Given  this,  our  analyses  of  Equations  (17)  and  (19)  also  apply  to 
Equations (22) and (23). The only difference is that we now assume ?2 >
?2 − ?2  and 𝐼0−1 > 𝐼2 , in contrast to our earlier assumptions that ?1 > ?1 −
?1 and 𝐼0 < 𝐼1. 
 
To see the negative real income affect, we first exclude the supply effect by 
holding ?2 = ?2 − ?2.  Since 
?2
?2+?2
= 1 and  
(?1+?2−?2)
?1+?2
= 1,  similar  to  our 
analyses of Equations (17) and (19), we know that the value of 𝑃𝑏2 reported in 
Equation (23) should be less than the value of 𝑉𝑏2 reported in Equation (22) if 
𝐼0−1 > 𝐼2. This means that, in Community B, the transaction price will be 
lower than the implicit price when the lower income group moves into the 
community. 
 
What does this mean for the price dynamics of Community B? Recall that 
there is a group of existing residents (with a real income level 𝐼0) who should 
move to Community A, but decided otherwise because they anticipated that 
the  price  in  their  community  will  keep  rising.  However,  when  this  belief 
changes,  it  is  in  their  best  interest  to  sell  their  properties  and  move  to 
Community A before more residents in their community put their properties 
on the market. In other words, the existing residents who have low moving 
costs (and do not like the new environment created by the new residents) 
should now tender their properties. 
 
The increase in the supply from the existing residents will create an additional 
force that further pushes down the transaction price. To see this supply effect, 
we assume, for instance, that the number of existing residents who will move 
out of the community is sufficiently large so that  ?₂ − ?2 < 0. Since ?2 ≥ 0 
(negative supply is not allowed), we know that ?2 > ?2 − ?2. Consequently, 
?2
?2+?2
< 1 and  
(?1+?2−?2)
?1+?2
< 1. When ?2 + ?2 and ?2 are only a small fraction 






< 1. From Equations (22) and (23), we 
know that, on top of the real income effect, the additional supply (resulting 
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further below the implicit price in the community.  We now see the bust period 
of a cycle. 
 
How can this happen? Recall that the developers should have estimated the 
supply level by forecasting the number of residents who will move into (and 
move out of) a community, and decide on the building volume based on the 
difference between these two estimates. However, there are existing residents 
who  should  move  out  of  a  community  (because  they  should  be  better  off 
living in another community) but did not (because of moving costs and/or 
their anticipation that prices in the community will rise further).  Because the 
developers  will build enough units to accommodate all residents including 
those who should have moved out, the market during the boom period will 
accumulate inventory.  Those residents, however, will begin to move out of 
the community when the market condition changes. This will, in turn, increase 
the supply level and further push down the transaction price level. It is fair to 
say that, the larger the inventory buildup during the boom period, the greater 
the pressure to push down the transaction price level during the bust period. 
  
In  comparing  Equation  (23)  with  Equation  (14),  it  is  clear  that  when  the 
number of residents who move out of a community is more than the number 
of  residents  who  move  in,  the  transaction  price  in  a  boom-and-bust 
community  (Community  B)  can  be  much  lower  than  that  in  a  stable 
community  (Community  A)  at  the  end  of  the  cycle.  The  increase  in  the 
inventory during the boom period is the key reason why the price can go bust. 
Without an inventory buildup period, Equations (23) and (14) indicate that the 
income effect alone will not be able to cause a serious boom-and-bust price 
pattern as the price level will move in tandem with the real income level. 
 
 
4.  Policy Implications 
 
Our  analyses  indicate  that  there  are  three  necessary  conditions  for  a 
community  to  form  a  boom-and-bust  price  movement  pattern.  First,  there 
must  be  changes  (increases  and/or  decreases)  in  the  income  level  of  this 
community.  However,  this  condition  alone  will  not  cause  a  cycle.  If  all 
residents  have  an  increase  (or  decrease)  in  income,  the  price  level  will 
accordingly rise (or fall). This means that the price level will fluctuate with 
the  movement  of  income.  Under  this  circumstance,  we  will  not  observe  a 
boom-and-bust  price  pattern  unless  there  is  a  boom-and-bust  real  income 
pattern, which is unlikely to happen.  
 
Given  this,  another  necessary  condition  is  that  there  is  a  wide  income 
distribution. In other words, residents are heterogeneous in the income level. 
This means that, while some residents (with a higher income) are comfortable 
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this circumstance, some residents (with a lower income) may have a stronger 
incentive to move out. However, they may not immediately move out because 
they anticipate that others will not immediately move out either. The need to 
select  an  optimal  time  to  move  out  will  only  happen  if  there  is  a  wide 
distribution of incomes. 
 
Finally, there must be an inventory buildup process during the boom period. 
We know that there are some low income residents who should have moved 
out, but did not do so in the initial period.  Since it is in the best interest of the 
developers to supply units to all residents, including those who should move 
out, the developers will build even if they believe that some of the residents 
will move out in the future. This will increase the inventory level during the 
boom period. The bust phase  will  follow once  the income effect becomes 
negative and/or once the existing residents begin to move out (because they 
perceive that others  will also  move out). Based on the three conditions (a 
change  in  income  level,  wide  distribution  in  income  levels,  and  inventory 
buildup  during  the  boom  period),  we  can  begin  to  predict  what  types  of 
communities (or countries) are more likely to experience a large boom-and-
bust cycle. 
     
Which countries or communities are more likely to experience a large change 
in real income in a short period? The answer must be developing countries or 
communities  with  a  move-in  of  new  industries  (that  pay  higher  wages  or 
produce  more  wealth).  Which  types  of  cities  have  a  wide  distribution  of 
incomes?  The  answer  must  be  cities  that  are  experiencing  a  change  in 
industrial  structures.  (For  example,  a  change  from  agricultural  to 
manufacturing jobs, or from manufacturing to information-related jobs.) In 
either case, many cities in China and other Asian countries fit these criteria. It 
might be fair to say that there are more cities in Asia (and particularly in 
China) than in developed countries that are currently in this type of situation. 
This indicates that a boom-and-bust price movement pattern is more likely to 
be  observed  in  Asia  (and  especially  in  China)  at  least  under  this  current 
economic environment. However, there is not much that a policy maker can 
do. The fast and uneven growth of income has caused many problems to the 
affected societies and the boom-and-bust price pattern is just one of them. We 
do not expect that we can see a quick fix to this problem if we need to first fix 
the income distribution problem. 
     
However, as a policy maker, it might be important to look at another type of 
income  that  affects  the  real  estate  market.  We  all  know  that  investors 
(especially those in China) also speculate in the residential property market. 
When a small portion of people in a society becomes rich quickly, this group 
of people will seek instruments to invest in. If one of the instruments they find 
is residential real estate, then there will be a flow of additional income into the 
properties of a community (just like a higher income group moving to a lower 277    Rational Explanation for Boom-and-Bust Price Patterns 
 
income area, as discussed before). Since investors and residents have different 
objectives (with the former looking for investment returns, while the latter 
looking for housing consumption) the investors might be willing and able to 
pay a higher price for a residence if they place more weight on future price 
appreciation.  (It should be noted that we do not consider an investment in 
income-producing properties, such as apartments, as a housing investment.) In 
other words, for an identical residence, investors might be willing and able to 
pay  a  price  higher  than  that  which  can  be  justified  by  the  current  rental 
income alone (or by the current income of the residents).  
   
When this happens, the inflow of investment income will have the same effect 
as the move-in of higher income residents. (See Chen et al. (2012) for a good 
discussion on investment demand in Taiwan.) It should be noted that investors 
do not have moving costs (which prevent residents from moving out of their 
current community), and therefore, are not attached to the communities they 
invest in. This means that they will move out very quickly when the price 
begins to decline. It might be fair to say that the investment demand can help 
form a boom-and-bust pattern. As such, a policy maker might need to seek 
ways  to  discourage  investment  capital  from  entering  into  a  residential 
community on a short term basis. 
     
As discussed in the model, we believe that the bust of a cycle mainly results 
from an inventory buildup process (or from the vacancy level caused by the 
move-out of existing residents at the end of the cycle).  In addition, we will 
not observe a large boom-and-bust cycle unless there is an inventory buildup 
process during the boom period. In our model, we assume that developers are 
rational and make supply decisions period by period based on the realized and 
the projected demands in each period. In other words, the maximum risk is the 
possibility of not being able to sell the units that they had built in one period. 
This assumption normally holds in the U.S., where builders take down some 
lots from subdivision developers who control phasing decisions in a rational 
way. However, if developers cannot make supply decisions period by period, 
then it is more likely for the developers to build up the inventory since they 
cannot  adjust  the  supply  based  on  market  conditions.  Is  it  possible  that 
developers will have to make supply decisions several periods before they can 
observe  the  realized  demand  in  each  period?  We  believe  that  it  is  quite 
possible  in  many  Asian  cities  (especially  in  Hong  Kong  or  other  cities  in 
China where a land auction system is used). 
 
There are at least two unique systems in the China property market. The first 
is  the  land  lease  auction  system.  The  consequence  of  this  system  is  that 
development  size  tends  to  be  large  as  the  site  and  buildable  size  of  each 
auctioned land lease tend to be large. Furthermore, since the timing of the land 
supply is controlled by the government through an auction process, there is a 
tendency for developers to stock up land leases so that they do not need to  Chan, Wang and Yang    278 
 
worry about the possibility of running out of development opportunities.  (See 
Qu and Liu (2012) and Lai and Wang (1999) for a discussion on the land lease 
auction system and the land bank practice by developers in China and Hong 
Kong.)  With  big  development  projects  and  a  land  bank  (which  does  not 
produce  income),  developers  might  have  less  control  on  their  supply 
decisions.  
 
The second unique system in China is the presale system. While the presale 
system is also used in other countries, it is the predominant method of selling 
development projects in China. Since most development projects in China are 
dense  developments  that  might  take  a  longer  time  to  complete,  the  gap 
between  the  time  to  start  a  pre-sale  (and  construction)  and  the  time  the 
demand is finally realized is normally longer than what we have observed for 
single family residences in the U.S.  Wang et al. (2000), Lai et al. (2004), 
Chan et al. (2008), Chan et al.  (2012), and Fang et al. (2012) have studied the 
impacts  of  the  pre-sale  system  on  the  supply  decisions  of  developers.  In 
general, the conclusion is that developers will tend to supply more units to the 
market  and  the  market  will  be  more  volatile  when  compared  to  markets 
without the pre-sale system. This also puts another restriction on the ability of 
developers to make a supply decision period by period based on the actual 
realized demand. 
 
To  sum  up,  our  model  indicates  that  it  might  be  helpful  for  regulators  to 
discourage investment demand in the housing market because, under the right 
conditions,  it could be a force that can cause  a boom-and-bust pattern. In 
China, the land lease auction system (and the associated land bank practice) 
and the presale system encourage developers to take on large projects and 
prepare for development opportunities well in advance. This means that it will 
be  difficult  for  developers  to  stop  developments  when  market  conditions 
change. If the aim of a regulator is to minimize the chance for a boom-and-
bust price pattern to occur, the regulator should figure out policies that will 
discourage developers from stocking up land (or holding land banks) and/or 
engaging  in  multi-period  developments  that  require  large  investments  in 
infrastructures at the early stage of the development. 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
This paper has developed a stylized model to explain the frequently observed 
boom-and-bust price movement patterns. We show that, with the inflow of a 
group  of  wealthy  residents,  the  transaction  price  in  a  community  will  be 
pushed upward. If this inflow lasts for a while and developers build up the 
inventory in the community during this price run-up period, we will see a 
significant  price  drop  after  the  inflow  of  new  capital  stops.  The  price 279    Rational Explanation for Boom-and-Bust Price Patterns 
 
movement pattern derived from this stylized model seems to conform to what 
we have observed in the real world. For policy makers, our model indicates 
that the key to minimizing the impact of a boom-and-bust cycle is to prevent 
an excessive inventory buildup at the price run-up stage. Although a slow 
increase in the inventory might fuel a price increase at the initial stage, the 
reduced level of inventory will also reduce the level of a price drop when the 
cycle ends. The amount of involvement by a government in the inventory 
control effort and better tools for controlling inventory buildup are topics for 
future studies. 
     
The weakness of our model is that it does not allow the players to have a 
perfect foresight based on all available information. Instead, players will have 
to make decisions period by period after the information in each period is 
revealed  to  the  public.  Furthermore,  our  stylized  model  can  only  give  the 
conditions  that  drive  a  particular  outcome  (the  boom-and-bust  price 
movement pattern), but cannot exactly model ways to endogenously derive 
these  conditions  (or  determine  if  the  moves  are  the  optimal  moves  of  the 
players). The weakness can  be corrected if  we are able to more explicitly 
model the supply decisions of developers and the moving decisions of existing 
residents and allow for perfect foresight.  
     
It appears that the results of our current  model  will still hold if  we allow 
developers to make supply decisions to maximize their total profits during the 
boom-and-bust period. However, we find it very difficult to model the move-
out decisions of existing residents. When is the optimal time for the existing 
low income residents to arbitrage the transaction price difference by moving 
from one community to another community that better matches their income 
levels and lifestyles? Clearly, this decision must have something to do with 
their moving costs as well as those of other residents in the same community. 
Since the decision of one resident to move out affects the move-out decisions 
of other residents and because the  moving cost of each resident is private 
information, we have failed to find a suitable utility (or objective) function to 
model  this  type  of  behavior.  We  believe  that  a  model  that  can  solve  this 
problem  will  greatly  enhance  our  understanding  about  the  boom-and-bust 
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